Understand: semiocide

When a label replaces a meaning

When someone comes to a psychiatrist in distress, they usually bring a story: something in their life, body or world has become unbearable. Often the first thing that story receives is a name, a diagnosis.

A diagnosis can help. It can open a door to treatment, explain an experience, or end years of being disbelieved. But it can also do something quieter. It can replace the person's own sense of what their distress is saying with an institution's account of what is wrong with them.

There is a word for the destruction of a living being’s own meaning-making: semiocide. It was first used by the Estonian palaeontologist Ivar Puura, and the philosopher Yogi Hendlin has developed it further. I came across it in a YouTube talk, and it has shaped how I think about diagnosis; I write about it on the site Psychiatric Diagnosis as Semiocide and on LinkedIn in Suffering, Symbol, and Science (19 April 2026).

The definition

How I apply it, from that site:

"the act of categorical psychiatric diagnosis functions as semiocide: the destruction of the patient's native meaning-making and its replacement by institutional meaning."

And, more concretely:

"When a person presents in distress and receives a DSM/ICD label, the sign they were carrying — 'something in my world requires change' — is killed and replaced with an institutional sign: 'you have a disorder.'"

What semiocide is not

It is easy to misread this idea, so here is what it does not say.

  • It is not a call to abolish diagnosis. In my words: "The biosemiotic framework does not propose the abolition of psychiatric diagnosis. It proposes that clinicians become aware of the semiotic operations they perform when they diagnose."

  • It is not a case against medication. "Pharmacology can, in some contexts, restore semiotic capacity." The harm, as I describe it, happens "when medication is deployed to suppress the sign rather than to enable the organism to read it."

  • It is not a claim that every diagnosis is wrong. It is about what happens to meaning when a category arrives too early, or is held too tightly.

Why it matters in practice

If distress carries a message, such as this job, this relationship or this environment is not survivable as it is, then naming it only as a disorder can mean the message is never read. The person may come to see themselves as faulty, rather than as someone responding to real conditions.

This connects with a well-established concern in philosophy of psychiatry. Ian Hacking showed that classifying people can change the people classified, who then change the classification. He called these "looping effects": Making up people (London Review of Books, 2006). Steven Hyman, a former director of the US National Institute of Mental Health, warned that diagnostic categories can become reified, treated as more real than the evidence supports: The diagnosis of mental disorders: the problem of reification (2010).

Questions you might ask

These are ordinary questions, and any good clinician should welcome them.

  • What does this diagnosis explain, and what does it leave out?

  • What else could account for how I've been feeling?

  • What in my circumstances might be keeping this going?

  • Is this diagnosis a working idea that we can revisit, or a conclusion?

The other side

Many people find a diagnosis a relief, not a loss, and many clinicians would say that categories are what make research, services and treatment possible. Kendler, Zachar and Craver argue that disorders are real but untidy "mechanistic property clusters", not mere labels: What kinds of things are psychiatric disorders? (2011). Semiocide is the lens I work with. It is my own argument, not established clinical guidance.

Going deeper

Last updated: 20 November 2026.

From brain in a box to mind in a living world. The river image is developed in Psychiatry After the Isolated Brain.

Sources

Ivar Puura, ‘Nature in Our Memory’, Sign Systems Studies 41(1), 2013 (first published in Estonian in 2002): doi.org/10.12697/SSS.2013.41.1.10

Yogi Hendlin, ‘Semiocide as Negation: Review of Michael Marder’s Dump Philosophy’, Biosemiotics, 2024: doi.org/10.1007/s12304-024-09558-x